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I. INTRODUCTION
HE concept of eminent domain is believed to have originated with
the seventeenth century legal scholar Grotius. 1 Grotius believed
that the state had the power to take property from individuals for
the good of society but was required to compensate those individuals in
return.2 There is no question today that federal, state, and local govern-
ments possess the power of eminent domain, that is, the power to take
privately owned property upon the payment of compensation. This no-
tion is squarely established and has been firmly embodied, at least indi-
rectly, in the law of this country in the Bill of Rights.3
In some cases it would appear, that the application of the theory of
eminent domain should be fairly straightforward. For instance, if the gov-
ernment takes a tract of land to build a highway, the remedy is clear if the
value of the land is easily determinable. Unfortunately, however, not all
situations are this simple. What if the government does not actually take
control of the property but instead imposes some regulation that effec-
tively eliminates any valuable use of the land? 4 Similarly, what if the
government, while allowing the owner to continue using his land, opens
the land to public use as well? 5
Owners of trade secrets are often challenged with these questions as
well as others. Since a trade secret is an intangible good, its value is often
difficult to determine. Trade secrets are not often sold on the open mar-
ket; they are, after all, secrets. Ownership of a trade secret gives a busi-
ness owner an advantage over the competition, but placing a dollar value
on this competitive advantage is not a simple matter. 6
The issues are further muddled in light of the Supreme Court's recent
redefinition of many of the takings issues in land regulation cases. In
1992, the Court held in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciP that a
landowner who must sacrifice all economically beneficial uses of his land
is entitled to compensation.8 It is unclear, however, how this ruling will
apply to non-land cases.
1. JOHN E. NOWAK, CONSTITUTnONAL LAW § 11.11 (1986).
2. Id. (citing GRO1TUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS lib. III. C. 20 VII 1 (1625), in J.
THAYER, 1 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895)).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (finding
state regulation prohibiting a taking if land becomes valueless); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (finding state regulation that would destroy coal company's
mining rights a taking); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (finding state prohibition of
alcohol not a taking of beer company's assets).
5. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding government must
pay just compensation to owner of private marina if government opens to free public
access).
6. See generally David G. Oberdick, The Taking of Trade Secrets: What Constitutes
Just Compensation?, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 247 (1986).
7. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
8. Id. at 2895.
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Further, just last year the Supreme Court announced the "rough pro-
portionality" test to determine the necessary nexus between the property
owner's loss and the government's goal.9 Once again, this rule was de-
scribed in the context of land use regulation. But how will it apply to
intangible property such as trade secrets?
This comment will first review the Takings Clause 10 and its application
in other contexts. In 1984, the Supreme Court clearly established that
intangible property rights, such as trade secrets, deserve the protection of
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment if they are recognized by
state law." This comment will analyze how the traditional taking doc-
trine is applied to these intangible property rights.
The second section of this comment reviews how the determination is
made as to whether a trade secret is a property right. First, the definition
of trade secrets throughout the states will be briefly reviewed. This com-
ment then looks at how courts apply these principles in finding property
that is protected by the Fifth Amendment.
The third section reviews whether a taking has occurred given that a
property right exists. Three factors are considered when analyzing
whether a taking has occurred. These are the character of the govern-
ment action, any interference with reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations, and the economic impact of the government's action.
In the fourth section, the public use doctrine will be reviewed. The
courts tend to be extremely deferential to the other branches and con-
sider most takings to be for a public use.
Finally, the compensation issue will be addressed in the fifth section.
Private misappropriation cases will be reviewed, as well as government
takings of patent rights, to determine the types of compensation that may
be available.
II. APPLICATION OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The government's right of eminent domain is not specifically enumer-
ated in the original Constitution. The right is, however, implicitly stated
in the Fifth Amendment, which requires just compensation whenever pri-
vate property is taken for a public use.12 Taking is "constitutional law's
expression for any sort of publicly inflicted private injury for which the
Constitution requires payment of compensation.' 1 3 The Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee of compensation for government takings is designed to
bar the government from "forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
9. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004-14 (1984).
12. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONsT. amend. V.
13. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1165 (1967).
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dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."14
Although the Fifth Amendment only applies to the federal govern-
ment, the requirement of compensation for the taking of private property
has also been applied to state and local governments through the Four-
teenth Amendment.15 Early on, the Supreme Court held that compensa-
tion for private property taken for public use is an essential element of
due process of law as prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.16 But
rather than simply incorporating the Fifth Amendment requirements into
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court appears to
have found independent public use and just compensation requirements
within the definition of Fourteenth Amendment due process. 17 In any
event, there is no question today that local governments can only take
private property if that taking is for a public use and just compensation is
provided to the aggrieved.
In analyzing whether the constitutional requirements have been met,
three major issues must be determined: (1) whether there was a taking,
(2) whether the taking was for a public use, and (3) whether just compen-
sation was provided.' 8 The next sections will review these three catego-
ries as well as the determination of the claimant's property interest.
A. GOVERNMENT ACTION WHICH AMOUNTS TO A TAKING
In general, a taking may be found when governmental activity results
in significant physical damage to property that impairs its use.19 A taking
has clearly occurred when the government physically seizes tangible
property from its owner. In addition, a taking can also occur in other
situations. To determine if a taking has occured, courts concentrate upon
the effect of the government action upon the citizen as opposed to the
benefit gained by the state.20 In fact, if the loss to the individual is great
enough, he can be compensated even though the government has not ac-
tually "taken" anything.2'
14. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
15. "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234 (1897). See also Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 159 (1980) (applying the takings
clause to action by a state).
17. NOWAK, supra note 1, § 11.11, at 399-400.
18. For trade secrets, a fourth criteria will also arise, namely whether the claimant has
a property interest.
19. NOWAK, supra note 1, § 11.12 (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166, 179-80 (1871)).
20. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) ("[C]ourts have
held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or inter-
est to the sovereign constitutes the taking.").
21. Id ("Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held,
if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the
subject matter, to amount to a taking.") (citations omitted).
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In determining if a taking has occurred the courts tend to look at sev-
eral factors. Although there is no set formula for determining when jus-
tice and fairness require compensation for a private burden,
considerations may include the economic impact of the regulation and
the character of the government action.22 In particular, the extent to
which the government has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations must be considered. 23
Whether the government has interfered with reasonable investment-
backed expectations turns out to be an important factor in many of the
cases in which it is alleged that a trade secret has been taken.24 There-
fore, it will be useful to contrast two cases in which a central issue turns
on whether there has been an interference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations.
Kaiser Aetna v. United States25 and Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins26 each deal with the property right to exclude others and whether
there has been a compensable government taking when this right has
been infringed. In Kaiser Aetna, a developer owned a private pond in a
shallow lagoon in Oahu, Hawaii. The owners invested substantial
amounts of money in dredging and developing this area into an exclusive,
private marina. The federal government later sought to compel free pub-
lic use of the private marina on the ground that the marina was connected
to navigable water. The Court held that the "right to exclude" is so uni-
versally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, that this
interest falls within the category of interests the government cannot take
without compensation.27 In reaching this conclusion, the Court weighed
the large investment made by the developers after being allowed to
dredge the waterway. Although the government could have prohibited
the dredging, they did not. When the government allowed the construc-
tion, they created a number of important expectations.28 As a result, the
government must condemn and pay for the ability to manage the land-
owner's property.29
On the other hand, Pruneyard Shopping Center provides a different
scenario. In Pruneyard Shopping Center, the owner of a shopping center
was sued by a group that wished to pass petitions within the shopping
center. Among other arguments, the owner alleged that any government
ruling allowing the petitioners on private property would be a taking
under the Fifth Amendment. The Court rejected this argument. 30 There
simply was no indication that the petitioners' activities would "unreason-
22. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
23. Id. at 124.
24. See infra part 1V.B.
25. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
26. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
27. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
28. Id. at 179.
29. Id.
30. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 83. The Court held that "[hiere the require-
ment that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free expression
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ably impair the value or use of the property as a shopping center."'31 The
shopping center was not built with the expectation that petitioners would
be excluded.
The Court distinguished Kaiser-Aetna by noting that, unlike the marina
owners, the shopping center owners failed to show that the right to ex-
clude others was essential to the use or economic value of the property.32
The marina owners depended upon the exclusiveness of the marina,
whereas the shopping center was already open to the public. It is likely
the shopping center would have been built even if the owners knew peti-
tioners would be allowed, and therefore the owner could not have had an
investment-backed expectation. On the other hand, the marina probably
would not have been built if it could not be exclusive.
B. TAKING CONTRASTED WITH REGULATION
It is well established that the government has the authority to regulate
the actions of private citizens through its police powers.33 Police power is
the inherent power of government to regulate in order to promote the
public health, safety, welfare, or morals; generally no compensation is re-
quired. 34 The question that often arises is: When does a regulation go far
enough to constitute a taking and, therefore, require compensation for
the aggrieved? 35 Since the eminent domain cases tend to be decided
based upon the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to fully predict
how individual cases will be decided. 36
The debate over what differentiates government action that constitutes
a taking from government action that constitutes regulation is epitomized
in the views of the elder Justice Harlan and Justice Holmes. 37 On the one
hand, Justice Harlan literally interpreted the taking requirement, believ-
ing compensation was not due unless the state actually appropriated pri-
and petition on shopping center property clearly does not amount to an unconstitutional
infringement of appellants' property rights under the Taking Clause." Id.
31. Id
32. Id at 84.
33. See NOWAK, supra note 1, § 11.12.
34. Id. § 11.10 (stating that the "police power" is what allows government to restrict
individual freedom unless specifically forbidden by the Constitution). See also E. CoRwIN,
LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 88, 173 (1948) (stating that police power is inherent for
state governments but not federal government, which must rely on enumerated powers).
35. See NOWAK, supra note 1, § 11.12; GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUnONAL
LAW 1579-82 (1991).
36. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for
determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than re-
main disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we have
frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered in-
valid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by
it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."
Id (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
37. See NOWAK, supra note 1, § 11.12, at 402-04.
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vate property.38 On the other hand, Justice Holmes had a much broader
interpretation, believing compensation was required whenever the state
imposed significant restrictions on private property.39 These two oppos-
ing views can be seen in the turn of the century cases of Mugler v. Kan-
sas4° and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.41
In Mugler, Kansas adopted a constitutional amendment prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors and the legislature enacted a
statute to enforce this prohibition. The proprietor of a brewery was sub-
sequently indicted for violating this statute. In an opinion by Justice
Harlan, the Court rejected the brewer's argument that he was entitled to
compensation because his property was required to be devoted to public
use.42 The Court stressed that the state had the right to regulate in order
to promote the benefit of the public.43 Unless the legislature intended to
"deprive the owner of his property and liberty" under the guise of police
regulation, compensation is not required. 44
The Court took a contrary view thirty-five years later in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.45 In Pennsylvania Coal Co., a Pennsylvania statute
limited coal mining in certain circumstances. After being sued to cease
mining as per the statute, a coal company sued claiming that the statute
exacted a taking of property. In a famous passage, Justice Holmes wrote
that "[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing."' 46 The difference between regulation and taking "is a question of
degree-and, therefore, cannot be disposed of by general proposi-
tions."'47 As a result, the Court held for the coal company,48 making it
clear that the acquisition of property to the exclusion of the owner is not
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 123 U.S. 623 (1887)
41. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
42. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
43. Id.
44. Id. The court stressed that the determination turns on whether a taking has
occurred.
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself
a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its
value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public
use, or from depriving a person of his property without due process of law.
In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property
is taken away from an innocent owner.
Id
45. 260 U.S. 393 (1992).
46. Id at 415.
47. Id at 416.
48. But cf Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBendictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The
Court upheld a modem day analogue of the statute overruled in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
The Court distinguished Pennsylvania Coal Co. on the grounds that the government action
was designed to arrest a significant threat to public welfare rather than simply balance the
interests of coal miners and the neighboring surface owners. Id. at 483. In addition, the
regulation in Pennsylvania Coal Co. made mining "commercially impracticable" while the
coal miners in Keystone had not made a similar showing. Id. at 484 (quoting Pennsylvania
Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414).
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a requirement to finding a taking.49 In fact, government permit require-
ments may now constitute a taking, depending upon the economic impact
of the action.50
In its recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,51 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the position that a regulation that denies all
economically beneficial use of land will be a taking and must be compen-
sated. 52 In Lucas, a deeloper purchased two lots of land for $975,000.
Subsequent to his purchase, the state passed a regulation that forbade
him from building on the land. The trial court determined that the regu-
lation had rendered his land valueless.
The Court categorically held that "when the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name
of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he
has suffered a taking. ''53 A state must compensate an owner for any reg-
ulation that prevents "all economically beneficial use" of property unless
"the proscribed use interests were not part of [the owner's] title to begin
with." 54
Although the landowner is entitled to compensation when the taking is
complete, when the taking is partial, the aggrieved must look to an analy-
sis based on certain factors.5 5 Some factors which will be considered are
the nature of the intrusion, the balance between the state's interest and
the private owner's interest, and the legitimacy of the state's interest.5 6
The regulating body must show that an "essential nexus" exists between a
legitimate state interest and the regulation being proposed.57 The impact
upon property owner loss must be roughly proportional "in nature and
extent" to the government goal.58
49. See Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413-16.
50. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use
of his or her property does not itself "take" the property in any sense. ...
Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses avail-
able to the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial
is to prevent "economically viable" use of the land in question can it be said
that a taking has occurred.
Id at 127.
51. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
52. Id. at 2893.
53. 1d. at 2895.
54. Id. at 2899.
55. See it at 2895 n.8.
56. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1581 (2d ed. 1991).
57. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
58. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319-20 (1994).
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C. REGULATION THAT REQUIRES DISCLOSURE OF TRADE SECRETS
Many of the trade secret cases arise in the context of regulation.5 9
Often, the issuance of a permit or license is dependent upon the disclo-
sure of information, some of which may be classified as a trade secret.
An early case that discusses government taking of trade secrets in the
context of regulation is Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy.6° The Kan-
sas legislature enacted a law requiring manufacturers to label the percent-
ages of all ingredients in syrup. The manufacturers claimed that this
requirement constituted a disclosure of trade secret information and
therefore amounted to a taking. The Court refused to recognize a taking,
stating that the manufacturer's right to maintain secrecy must be subject
to the state's right to promote fair dealing.61
The issue of disclosure of proprietary information to conform with gov-
ernment regulation arose again in the more recent Supreme Court case of
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 62 For the first time in 1984, the Court held
that a trade secret may by protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 63 The review of the modem approach to the taking of trade
secrets begins with an analysis of the Monsanto case.
D. RUCKELSHAUS v-. MONSANTO Co.
The Monsanto opinion sets forth the history of the enactment and
amendments made to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA).64 A brief synopsis is set forth below. In 1947, Congress
passed FIFRA, which was primarily a licensing and labeling statute.
Upon the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in
1970, many of the Department of Agriculture's responsibilities under
FIFRA were transferred to the EPA.
In 1972, Congress amended the FIFRA requirement that any applica-
tion for license must provide test data to ensure that chemicals are safe.
Applicants could signify data as a trade secret. The EPA was in turn pro-
hibited from publicly disclosing any information that contained these
trade secrets. The amended act also allowed the EPA to consider data
submitted by one applicant in the application of another, provided the
subsequent applicant offered to compensate the original submitter.
59. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); New Jersey State
Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985); Chevron Chem. Co. v.
Costle, 641 F.2d 104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
60. 249 U.S. 427 (1919).
61. Id. at 431. The Court explained that "it is too plain for argument that a manufac-
turer or vendor has no constitutional right to sell goods without giving to the purchaser fair
information of what it is that is being sold." Id. at 431. See also National Fertilizer Ass'n v.
Bradley, 301 U.S. 178 (1937) (upholding a South Carolina statute requiring labelling of
fertilizer bags).
62. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
63. Id. at 1003-04.'
64. Id. at 990-97.
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In 1978, Congress once again amended FIFRA. This 1978 amendment
created a ten year exclusive use period for the original submitter. The act
also included a provision that provided for disclosure of all health, safety,
and environmental data to qualified requestors, notwithstanding the pro-
hibition against disclosure of trade secrets. The act, however, did not au-
thorize disclosure of information that would reveal "manufacturing or
quality control processes" or certain other details.65
Monsanto applied for a license for a pesticide it had developed. The
company had incurred costs in excess of $23.6 million in developing the
health, safety, and environmental data submitted under FIFRA require-
ments.66 Much of this data submitted contained trade secrets. When the
EPA began to disclose the secret information submitted by Monsanto, as
allowed under the 1978 version of FIFRA, Monsanto sued, alleging a tak-
ing of property without just compensation.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that "to the extent that Mon-
santo has an interest in its health, safety, and environmental data cogniza-
ble as a trade-secret property right under Missouri law, that property
right is protected by the Taking[s] Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 67
In its analysis, the Court looked at three separate time periods: before
1972, between 1972 and 1978, and after 1978. There was no taking for
data submitted prior to 1972 (when there was no provision for keeping
secret) or after 1978 (when the statute provided that data would be pub-
licly disclosed). 68 On the other hand, there was a taking for data submit-
ted between 1972 and 1978 when data submitted was designated as trade
secret data and the statute prohibited public disclosure of trade secret
information. 69
In reaching this conclusion, the Court set out the framework for deter-
mining if a compensable taking has occurred. First, it must be deter-
mined whether the allegedly aggrieved party had a recognized property
interest.70 The next inquiry is to determine whether there has been a
taking.71 If there has been a taking, the next question is whether the
taking was for a public use.72 Finally, the determination must be made
whether the statute provides for just compensation. 73 In the following
sections, this comment will review each of these issues.
65. Id. at 996.
66. Monsanto claimed that its development of trade secrets required a massive com-
mitment of resources and energy costing the company $70 million in 1981 alone. Brief for
Appellee at 21, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (No. 83-196).
67. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
68. Id. at 1013.
69. Id. at 1013.
70. Id. at 1000.
71. Id.




III. PROPERTY INTERESTS PROTECTED BY
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
In a case that predates Monsanto, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit was faced with determining whether the provisions of FIFRA
constituted a taking that required compensation. 74 Chevron Chemical
developed two pesticides for which they obtained patents. However,
before being able to sell these chemicals, the company was required to
provide test data in order to obtain licensure from the EPA. Chevron
expended over one million dollars in compiling this data, an amount
greater than the actual development costs. Because of the great invest-
ment, Chevron took steps to treat the test data as trade secrets.
Prior to 1972 the EPA was using this test data, without disclosure, in
the approval of applications, called "me-too" applications, of the same or
similar chemicals by other companies. However, the 1972 version of
FIFRA prohibited the EPA from using any data designated as a trade
secret in the application of another. Chevron sued the administrator of
the EPA claiming that the use of Chevron's test data before 1972 consti-
tuted a taking without just compensation.
The court of appeals rejected Chevron's claim because the company
did not have a protectable property interest. 75 In determining whether
federal due process requirements apply, there must be an entitlement cre-
ated by law.76 The court could find neither a federal nor a state law
which created a property right and therefore ended the analysis at that
point. 77 The court, in dicta, went on to hypothesize whether any state law
could have protected the confidentiality of the data submitted volunta-
rily.78 The court doubted this protection would have survived Supremacy
Clause scrutiny.79 They never reached this issue, however, because no
such state law was found.
The Supreme Court in Monsanto made clear that the court of appeals
analysis in dicta was not the deciding factor.80 If state law creates a prop-
erty interest, then this interest is protected by the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.8' Therefore the first hurdle is to find a property right.
74. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981).
75. Id. at 117.
76. Id. at 114.
77. Id. at 115.
78. Id. at 116.
79. Chevron, 641 F.2d at 116 (referring to the Supremacy Clause which states "[tihis
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... ." U.S. CONST. art VI.).





A property right must be found in an existing law, other than the Tak-
ings Clause of the Constitution.8 Trade secret protection may arise from
two sources: state law or federal statute.8 3 Many states recognize trade
secrets as property because of their similarity to other forms of tangible
property.84 But just what is a trade secret and when does the property
interest in it vest for the purpose of finding a Fifth Amendment taking?
Several different definitions of trade secrets are used by the states. The
two most commonly used definitions are derived from the original Re-
statement of Torts and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The original Re-
statement of Torts defines a trade secret as "any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and that
gives one an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it.''85 The Restatement notes that an exact definition of a
trade secret is not possible but does list several factors to consider in de-
termining whether given information is a trade secret.86
A trade secret may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine
or other device, or a list of customers.87 In addition, confidential business
information is property.88 Specific business information that have been
82. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("[P]roperty interests.., are
not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source."). See also
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980):
83. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 739 (3d Cir.
1985), aff'd on other grounds, Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990). In
unusual cases, property rights can also arise because certain items have traditionally been
treated as property. See Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1269-70 (1992) (holding
that Former President Nixon has a property interest in his presidential papers, which he
claims include trade secrets, because every president before and after Nixon treated presi-
dential papers as private property).
84. 1 MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01(2) (1994).
85. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939).
86. Id The factors are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2)
the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his busi-
ness; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the infor-
mation; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be prop-
erly acquired or duplicated by others.
Id
87. Id. More recently, the Department of Justice told Congress that "formulae, de-
signs, drawings, research data, etc., which although set forth on pieces of paper, are signifi-
cant not as records but as items of valuable property." United States Department of
Justice, Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act 34 (1967), quoted in Brief for Appellee at 20, Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (No. 83-196).
88. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987); Formax, Inc. v. Hostert, 841
F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1988). But some states leave business information out of their
criminal statutes. For example, a Michigan statute defines a trade secret as "the whole or
any portion or phase of scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure,
formula or improvement which is secret and of value." Mic-. COMP. LAWS § 752.771.1(3)
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considered trade secrets include: procedures, lists of suppliers, lists of
customers, and business codes. 89 A trade secret may or may not be
patentable. 90
Under the Restatement definition, in order to be considered a trade
secret, the information cannot be general knowledge; that is, it must be
secret. 91 The element of secrecy is required before the information can
be considered a trade secret and must be maintained in secrecy in order
for the information to remain a trade secret.92 If the owner discloses his
or her trade secret publicly or to a person who has no obligation to main-
tain confidentiality, then the property right is extinguished.93
The Restatement definition of trade secrets is followed in a number of
states. 94 Yet other states follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.95 The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act was developed to codify the basic principles
of common law trade secret protection while preserving its essential dis-
tinction from patent law. 96
As is clear from the second requirement, the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, like the Restatement, requires the owner to maintain secrecy. The
Act also requires that the secret "not [be] readily ascertainable by proper
means." 97 Proper means of discovery include, but are not limited to, in-
(1992). See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637.2 (1993) (defining trade secret as "scientific
or technical information... which the owner thereof intends to be available only to per-
sons selected by him"); TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.05(4) (West 1989) (limiting trade secrets to
"scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or improvement"
in the criminal context).
89. FLA. STAT. § 812.081(1)(c) (1992).
90. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939); See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (establishing that neither the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution nor federal patent statutes preempt state trade secret protection for patent-
able information).
91. Id at 474-75.
92. American Precision Vibrator Co. v. National Air Vibrator Co., 764 S.W.2d 274,
276 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988), aff'd, 771 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1989).
93. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002.
94. See, e.g., American Precision Vibrator Co. v. National Air Vibrator Co., 764
S.W.2d 274,276 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988) (applying the RESTATEMENT'S defi-
nition of trade secret in Texas), aff'd, 771 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1989); FLA. STAT.
§ 812.081(1)(c) (1992) (codifying a modified version of the RESTATEMENT definition of
trade secret).
95. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985). The Uniform Trade Secrets
Act defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not be-
ing generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Id. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-75-601 (1994); MINN. STAT. § 609.52 (1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-14-402 (1994); S.C. ADVANCE LEG. SERVICE, Act 437, § 39-8-1(4) (1993);
WIs. STAT. § 134.90 (1991-1992).
96. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr, Prefatory Note of National Conference of Commis-




dependent discovery, discovery through reverse engineering, discovery
under a license from the trade secret owner, discovery through observa-
tion in public, or discovery from published literature.98 Proper means are
contrasted with improper means which include "theft, bribery, misrepre-
sentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain se-
crecy, or espionage through electronic or other means." 99
In the official comments to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the Com-
missioner noted another difference between the Act and the Restate-
ment.1°° The Restatement required that a trade secret be "continuously
used in one's business." 101 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act broadens the
definition by omitting this requirement. 102 In fact, the comments specifi-
cally include information which obtains value from a negative view-
point.10 3 For example, the results of lengthy and expensive research
which prove that a certain process will not work could be of great value
to a competitor. 1°4
As can be seen, states have varying views on the issue of what consti-
tutes a trade secret. As a result, deciding whether intellectual property is
a trade secret depends upon which state law is being used. In the context
of takings, the important question is not only whether the information is a
trade secret but also whether the trade secret is property which rises to a
high enough level to be protected from government seizure by the Fifth
Amendment.
B. FINDING A PROTECr-ABLE PROPERTY RIGHT IN TRADE SECRET
In Monsanto the Supreme Court announced that the owner of a trade
secret could have a property right which is protected by the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 10 5 A review of the next three cases will
reveal some insight as to how this rule has been applied.
In United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Auchter,1°6 a la-
bor union sued the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) challenging
the government's decision not to require disclosure of the chemical com-
98. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985).
99. UNF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 439 (1985). In fact, by 1974 over
20 states had enacted criminal statutes prohibiting the misappropriation of trade secrets.
See Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 540 n.ll (2d Cir. 1974)
(listing statutes).
100. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 439 (1985).
101. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cnt. b (1939).
102. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § VI ant., 14 U.L.A. 439 (1985). S.C. ADVANCE LEG.
SERVICE, Act 437, § 39-8-1, Comm'r Comment (1992).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
106. 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, Dole v. United Steelworkers of
Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990). See also United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Pender-
grass, 819 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987); United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Pendergrass, 855 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1988) (intervening cases).
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pounds to which workers were exposed. 10 7 The government determined
it could not require disclosure of certain information without compensat-
ing the business. 10 8
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 10 9 requires disclo-
sure of hazardous chemicals to employees." 0 The rule includes an excep-
tion for chemicals claimed as trade secrets."' For these chemicals, the
company must disclose hazardous properties and suggest appropriate
precautions. In addition, in case of emergency, the company must iden-
tify the chemicals to medical personnel but can require a confidentiality
agreement in return. The manufacturer is not required to disclose the
precise formula but must only identify the chemicals in the compound.
The issue turned on the definition of a trade secret.1 2 The EPA's defi-
nition of trade secret was much broader than the Restatement definition
because the EPA's definition also included information which was deter-
minable by reverse engineering."13 The EPA justified this broader defini-
tion by pointing out that many products can only be reverse engineered
with the use of sophisticated analytical techniques. 114 Because competi-
tors often do not, in fact, use the information, it remains a trade secret." 5
The court disagreed with the EPA's analysis claiming there was no legal
justification for affording broader trade secret protection than state law
affords.116 The Restatement's definition was broader than the definition
used within many other regulatory schemes, and the EPA's definition
here was broader still." 7 In fact, the court noted that the Fifth Amend-
ment did not require any protection since the companies were receiving a
license in exchange for disclosure." 8 As a result, the court instructed the
107. Interestingly, this cases arises in a somewhat different context than many of the
other cases in this area. While both the trade secret owner and the government agree that
disclosure of the secret would effect a taking, a third party has brought suit to require
disclosure. A similar situation also arose in Tri-Bio Lab., Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d
135 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818 (1988).
108. See Tri-Bio, 763 F.2d at 739.
109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
110. "Any standard ... shall prescribe the use of labels or other appropriate forms of
warning as are necessary to insure that employees are apprised of all hazards to which they
are exposed, relevant symptoms and appropriate emergency treatment, and proper condi-
tions and precautions of safe use or exposure." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (1982).
111. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i) (1984).
112. The EPA defined a trade secret as:
[A]ny confidential formula, pattern, process, devise, information or compila-
tion of information (including chemical name or other unique chemical iden-
tifier) that is used in an employer's business, and that gives the employer an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or
use it.
United Steelworkers, 763 F.2d at 740 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1984)). Compare
§ 1910.1200(c) with the RESTATEMENT definition infra note 64.
113. United Steelworkers, 763 F.2d at 740.




118. Tri-Bio, 763 F.2d at 741; see infra part III.C for a discussion of when a taking has
occurred in these situations,
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EPA to reconsider a definition of trade secret that does not include chem-
icals that can be determined by reverse engineering. 119
Another case which demonstrates the approach taken in determining
whether a property right exists is Lariscey v. United States.120 Lariscey
presents an interesting set of facts. A prisoner was employed by the gov-
ernment as a laborer in a Texas prison manufacturing facility. On his own
time and in his cell, he developed a device for cutting helmet material
which worked better than the many other devices that had been tried.
After developing the superior device, Lariscey requested a patent attor-
ney but was refused. Not only could he not patent his invention, but he
was forced to demonstrate his device. After the government decided to
use the cutting device, Lariscey sued complaining of a Fourteenth
Amendment taking.
The Claims Court found that no trade secret property right existed be-
cause Lariscey did not maintain a confidential relationship with the
prison. 121 The lower court stressed that the prisoner was not negotiating
to license his invention. 122 In fact, the prison superintendent had told
Lariscey that he no longer owned the invention. 123
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims
Court holding. 24 The court first noted that trade secrets are derived
from the common law125 and Texas uses the Restatement rule for trade
secrets. 126 Using the Restatement test, Lariscey did have a property
right. 127 The device was maintained in secrecy as best he could.' 28 In
fact, a prison would appear to be ideally adapted for the maintenance of
secrecy against competitors. 29 The court further held that the forced
demonstration was not 'a release of a property right. 30 First, the prisoner
had limited choice.' 3 ' Second, Lariscey did not automatically lose his
119. Id at 741-42. As an interesting aside, the court noted that the EPA originally
proposed a regulation where chemical identity information must be disclosed, but "[w]hen
representatives of the chemical industry commented on the importance of trade secrets to
the economic health of that industry, the Secretary adopted an entirely new approach." Id.
at 740 (citation omitted). One must wonder if, in reaching its final determination, the court
did not feel an obligation to protect the public from outside political influences.
120. 949 F.2d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1991), reh'g granted, 962 F.2d 1047, aff'd by equally di-
vided court, 981 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993).
121. Lariscey v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 385, 390 (1990), rev'd, 949 U.S. 1137 (Fed. Cir.
1991), aff'd by equally divided court, 981 F.2d 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2297 (1993).
122. It at 389.
123. Id. at 390.
124. Lariscey, 949 F.2d at 1143.
125. Id. at 1141.
126. Id See American Precision Vibrator Co. v. National Air Vibrator Co., 764 S.W.2d
274, 276 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, n.w.h.) (applying the RESTATEMENT'S defi-
nition of trade secret in Texas).
127. Lariscey, 949 F.2d at 1143.






property right since he made his intention to maintain secrecy known.132
The government knew the prisoner had built this device and deemed it to
be his own.133 In weighing all these factors, the appeals court determined
that Lariscey had a protectable property right and the government must
compensate him if they wished to acquire this property. 134
The Colorado case of City of Northglenn v. Grynberg35 provides an-
other interesting application of the Taking Doctrine. In 1978, the City of
Northglenn began choosing sights for a new water reservoir project. The
surface estate of the land chosen was owned by a. third party while, unbe-
knownst to the city, Grynberg owned the mineral rights.136 Before learn-
ing of Grynberg's interest and with the permission of the surface owner,
the city drilled into the land to learn, among other things, whether there
were any valuable coal reserves below. A publicly accessible report was
later prepared indicating that no economically feasible coal was available.
When Grynberg learned of the city's activity on the land, he sued on a
number of counts. Among them, Grynberg claimed that the city effected
a taking of his property by publicly disclosing the results of the drilling
tests.
The court indicated that "[a]n owner of mineral rights has a property
interest in the proprietary information which can be gathered by way of
geophysical exploration of his or her land."'1 37 Much of the value of an
unexplored coal lease is that information regarding the coal is un-
known.' 38 However, the owner must have exclusive access to the infor-
mation for it to have value; in other words, the information must be
secret.13
9
Although the court agreed that the subsurface information could be a
trade secret that would effect a taking, they reached the conclusion that in
this case the information disclosed in the report was not sufficiently ex-
clusive to be a valid property interest.140 The court went on to conclude
that the mere publication of a report that a leaseholder's leased property
does not have commercially exploitable coal reserves is not, by itself, a
132. Lariscey, 949 F.2d at 1142
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1143.
135. 846 P.2d 175 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 63 (1993) [hereinafter Grynberg If].
The facts of this case are given in the prior case of Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739
P.2d 230 (Colo. 1987) [hereinafter Grynberg I].
136. The city had searched the title but did not learn of Grynberg because he had failed
to record his leasehold.
137. Grynberg II, 846 P.2d at 182.
138. Id. "An owner, who may not have the wherewithal to mine or explore for miner-
als, may be able to make a substantial profit by selling an option to mine the minerals to
someone who does possess the resources to explore or mine the minerals." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 184. The court noted that "[wihile we do not decide here whether geophysi-
cal information in general may or may not be a 'trade secret,' the amount of information
publicly available regarding the coal reserves ... clearly shows that Grynberg's access to
the information was not sufficiently exclusive to qualify as a trade secret ...." Grynberg
II, 846 P.2d at 184 n.17.
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taking of property.141 The only claim the leaseholder may have is in tort,
and then only if the report is not accurate. 142
IV. GOVERNMENT TAKING OF TRADE SECRET PROPERTY
A trade secret retains its value only so long as it remains a secret. As
such, the economic value of the property right in a trade secret lies in the
competitive advantage that the secret provides.143 Once the secret is dis-
closed, all competitive advantage is gone and with it goes all economic
value. In other words, once the trade secret is disclosed to others, the
holder of the trade secret has lost her property interest.1"
The right to exclude others is one of the valuable characteristics of
property. 145 This right is inherent in the definition of trade secrets since
an owner will lose all property rights if he does not exclude his competi-
tors, i.e., does not keep his information secret. In this same vein, if the
government uses one person's trade secret information for the benefit of
another, then that person will have suffered an economic loss, even if the
specific contents of the trade secret have not been disclosed.' 46
Accordingly, a taking may occur when the government discloses a
trade secret or uses it for the benefit of another. But the Fifth Amend-
ment's taking doctrine is based in equity and, as a result, there is no set
formula to determine when a taking has occurred.' 47 In real property
cases, a two part test has been used to determine when a taking has oc-
cured.'4 8 The Court will look to whether the government action fails to
advance a legitimate government interest or whether the government ac-
tion effectively deprives the aggrieved of all economic value.149 The
Court also often looks to whether the action interferes with investment
backed expectations.' 50
A. CHARACrER OF GOVERNMENT ACTION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a statute re-
quiring the disclosure of mineral exploration data effected a taking of
141. Id. at 184. The court cited Lipson v. State Dep't of Highways, 588 P.2d 390, 391-92
(Colo. Ct. App. 1978), for the proposition that "the mere announcement of impending
condemnations, coupled as it may well be with substantial delay and damage, does not, in
the absence of the acts which may be translated into an exercise of dominion and control
by the condemning authority, constitute a taking so as to warrant awarding compensation."
Grynberg II, 846 P.2d at 184.
142. Id.
143. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984).
144. Id. at 1011.
145. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (stating that the right to
exclude is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property").
146. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1012.
147. Pennsylvania Cent. ransp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
148. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
149. Id.
150. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123; Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005.
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trade secrets. 151 In 1977, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute
which required explorers to disclose certain geographic data acquired
while exploring for minerals. This data would be publicly disclosed three
years after submission. Noranda, a mineral exploration business, in-
vested almost four million dollars over a seven year period to acquire
data relating to subsurface conditions. The company then sued to enjoin
the state from requiring the data and to declare the statute
unconstitutional.
The court analyzed the situation under the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and also under the Wisconsin Constitution. 152 After
determining that Noranda had a protectable property interest in the ex-
ploration data, 53 the court looked to whether the statute was a legitimate
exercise of police power.' 54 The test was to find the purpose of the stat-
ute and then determine whether this purpose was advanced.' 55 The court
determined that the disclosure of confidential information bore no rea-
sonable relationship to the goals of the statute and therefore the disclo-
sure comprised an unconstitutional taking.
156
The line of reasoning utilized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court is con-
sistent with U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In land taking cases, the gov-
ernment must show a substantial nexus between the taking and a
legitimate state interest. 57 The government requirement must be
roughly proportional to a legitimate purpose.'5 8 The regulating body
"must make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the proposed develop-
ment's impact.' 59 If the land taking is total, the owner will almost cer-
tainly be entitled to compensation. 60 By analogy, one can predict a
similar analysis would be taken with respect to intellectual property.
151. Noranda Exploration, Inc. v. Ostrom, 335 N.W.2d 596 (Wis. 1983).
152. Id. at 601. The Wisconsin Constitution states that "It]he property of no person
shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor." Id. (quoting Wis.
CONST. art. I, § 13).
153. Noranda, 335 N.W.2d at 603. The state-recognized property right was found in the
statute which provided for the disclosure. One of the goals of the statute was in "protect-
ing proprietary rights in such information." Id. (quoting Wis. STAT. § 107.15 (1977)).
154. Id. at 604.
155. Id. The purpose of the legislation was "to further the public interest in informed
decision-making by appropriate state agencies ... and at the same time protecting proprie-
tary rights in such information." Id. (quoting Wis. STAT. § 107.15(1) (1977)).
156. Id. at 604-05. The court put weight in the fact that "the instant case involves the
state's acquisition of a private citizen's property, and the distribution of that property (af-
ter the period of confidentiality ends) to other private citizens for their benefit." Id. at 605.
It should be noted that Noranda was decided a year before the Supreme Court ruling in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto. Although the ruling in Noranda is not inconsistent with Mon-
santo, it is possible that a court reviewing the same issue today would find that Noranda
did not have a reasonable, investment-backed expectation of protection of, at least, the
data collected after the statute was enacted in 1977. See infra part B. Of course, if the
court relied on the Wisconsin Constitution, the Monsanto decision would be non-binding.
157. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
158. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994).
159. Id. at 2319-20.
160. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992).
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On the other hand, if the government acts to protect trade secrets, then
a taking has not occurred. 161 Although International Funding Institute
was reviewed primarily as a First Amendment case, it does provide an
interesting insight into how the government can act to protect the intel-
lectual property of those affected by regulation.
The Federal Election Campaign Act' 62 required political committees to
publicly disclose all contributors who donate more than $200 in a calen-
dar year.' 63 These lists, however, could not be sold or used by others.' 64
This prohibition was protected by allowing submitters to include ten
pseudonyms that could be used to track violations. 65 By prohibiting
others from using the submitted lists and employing a mechanism to find
violations, the government protected the submitter's interest even though
the list could no longer be considered a trade secret because it was no
longer secret.' 66 This government action was sufficient to avoid a taking
under the Fifth Amendment. 167
B. INTERFERENCE WITH REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS
For there to be a taking, there must be a "reasonable investment
backed expectation.' 68 In other words, there must be more than a "uni-
lateral expectation or an abstract need.' 69 A trade secret is not pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment if the owner voluntarily disclosed it in
exchange for a registration and he had notice at the time of disclosure
that the government was authorized to use all the data submitted.170
Unfortunately for trade secret owners who cannot market their prod-
ucts without government licensing, this requirement, for all practical pur-
poses, eliminates any trade secret protection for information which the
government feels a need to disclose. As long as the owner is aware that
the information may be disclosed and the disclosure is rationally related
to a legitimate government interest, a submission under these conditions
161. See Federal Election Comm'n v. International Funding Inst., 969 F.2d 1110 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 605 (1992).




166. See 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (1988).
167. Federal Election Comm'n, 969 F.2d at 1121 (Randolph, J., concurring) (noting that
"[ijf the government forced political committees to disclose their lists to the public without
imposing any restrictions on how the lists might be used, this might constitute a taking
under the Fifth Amendment").
168. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984). For a criticism of the
Court's expectation based analysis, see Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Counci& A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369 (1993).
169. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005-06 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)).
170. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 741 (1985), aff'd on other
grounds, Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
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does not constitute a taking.171 As the Court in Monsanto stated, a vol-
untary submission of a trade secret to the government in exchange for
economic advantages "can hardly be called a taking."'1 72
Therefore, the determination of whether a trade secret owner has a
reasonable investment-backed expectation of maintaining his secret turns
on whether the owner is on notice his trade secret may be disclosed. This
question can usually be answered by reviewing the legislation under
which the information was obtained by the government to see if the sub-
mitter was forewarned of possible disclosure. In general, there are three
possibilities: (1) the legislation prohibits disclosure, (2) the legislation
provides for disclosure, or (3) the legislation is silent on whether there
will be disclosure. The next three sub-sections will review each of these
possibilities.
1. Legislation Prohibits Disclosure of Trade Secret Information
The easiest case for a trade secret owner to prove he had an expecta-
tion that his trade secret would not be disclosed is when the legislation
specifically states that the trade secret will not be disclosed.
In Monsanto, a unanimous Supreme Court found that Monsanto had
an investment-backed expectation that the trade secret information sub-
mitted between 1972 and 1978 would not be disclosed.173 During this
time, the statute gave Monsanto explicit assurance that the EPA was pro-
hibited from publicly disclosing any data submission determined to be a
trade secret.174 This explicit governmental guarantee formed the basis of
a reasonable investment-backed expectation.175 Therefore, any disclo-
sure or use for the benefit of another of data submitted by Monsanto
between 1972 and 1978 would affect a governmental taking.
2. Legislation Allows Disclosure of Trade Secret Information
The second situation arises when the legislation specifically allows for
government disclosure of information submitted by a trade secret owner.
Once again, the analysis of this situation, although seemingly unfair, is
fairly straightforward. As long as the submitter is aware of the conditions
under which the information is submitted and the conditions are ration-
171. New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606, 628
(D.N.J.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit in an
earlier case noted in dicta that "[t]he only instance in which a taking of proprietary infor-
mation might occur is the involuntary use of proprietary information in a rulemaking pro-
ceeding (or perhaps as a witness in a licensing or adjudicatory proceeding) pursuant to
compulsory process." Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 555 F.2d 82, 95 (3d Cir. 1977).
172. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 555 F.2d at 95 (3d
Cir. 1977) (denying power company's claim of uncompensated taking of information vol-
untarily submitted in application for license to operate nuclear power plant).
173. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013. See supra part L.A for a summary of the 1972 and
1978 FIFRA amendments.




ally related to a legitimate government interest, a voluntary submission of
data in return for an economic advantage will not be considered a
taking. 176
For example, in Monsanto a unanimous Court found Monsanto did not
have a reasonable investment-backed expectation that trade secrets dis-
closed after 1978 would not be disclosed.177 The 1978 amendment to
FIFRA created a ten year exclusive use period after which all data sub-
mitted could be used without the submitter's permission. Since Mon-
santo was on notice of this provision at the time it submitted the data, the
company could not have reasonably expected that the data would be kept
secret. 178 The Court rationalized Monsanto's loss by reminding the com-
pany that "such restrictions are the burdens we all must bear in exchange
for 'the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized
community.' ,,179
Another case in which these issues arose was New Jersey State Chamber
of Commerce v. Hughey. 80 In 1984, New Jersey enacted the Worker and
Community Right to Know Act.181 The Act required, among other
things, employers to publicly disclose the use of certain hazardous sub-
stances. 182 In addition, the Act contained a procedure by which employ-
ers could claim the presence of certain substances as trade secrets-not
to be revealed to the public.' 83 However, the Right to Know Act also
addressed a category of particularly dangerous chemicals designated as
special health hazard substances. 184 For these chemicals, no trade secret
protection was available.' 85 Companies which used this class of particu-
larly dangerous chemicals brought suit claiming the forced disclosure of
these specially designated chemicals constituted a Fifth Amendment
taking.
In analyzing this situation, the court followed the Supreme Court's
analysis in Monsanto.186 In general, trade secrets are property rights
under New Jersey law and therefore are protected from a taking without
just compensation. 87 However, since the companies knew at the time of
submission the information would be disclosed, they could not have had a
176. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007. See also United States v. Geophysical Corp., 732 F.2d
693 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that disclosure requirements for applicants for permits to ex-
plore the continental shelf do not effect an unconstitutional taking).
177. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013.
178. Id. at 1006.
179. Id. at 1007 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979) (quoting Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
180. 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985). See also Manufacturers Ass'n v. Knepper, 801 F.2d
130 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987) (reviewing the Pennsylvania Right to
Know Act).
181. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-1 (West 1993).
182. Id. § 34:5A-2.
183. Id. § 34:5A-3, 34:5A-15.
184. Id. § 34:5A-5(b).
185. Id.
186. New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606, 623
(D.N.J.), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985).
187. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. at 627.
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reasonable expectation of protection. 188 Consequently, disclosure of the
data was not a taking for which the state must pay compensation under
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. 189
In Department of Natural Resources v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp.,190
the Alaska Supreme Court faced deciding whether a state law' 9' requir-
ing disclosure of oil well drilling information was a compensable taking.
The land owner, Arctic Slope, and the lessee, Chevron, spent over $40
million drilling the well and, in the process, gathered substantial informa-
tion about the subsurface geography of the land. 92 When data was due
to be released under the statute, the oil companies sued to enjoin the
state from disclosing the information.
The court followed the analysis from Monsanto.193 First, oil well data
constitute trade secrets under both the Alaska and United States Consti-
tutions. 194 The court then concluded that the companies did not have a
reasonable investment-backed expectation that the information would
not be disclosed.' 95 The companies were on notice that the government
in fact used confidential data in its decision making.196
The Alaska Supreme Court went on to hold that even if the companies
did have an expectation that the information would not be disclosed, this
expectation was not investment backed. 197 The assumption that the in-
formation would not be disclosed did not affect the company's decision
on whether to invest in the oil wells.' 98 Therefore, even if a trade secret
owner expects that her secret will be held in confidence, the government
is not forbidden from disclosing the secret unless the owner relied on this
expectation.
188. Id at 628.
189. Id.
190. 834 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1991).
191. ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.035 (1978).
192. This information was particularly valuable because the region had not yet been
drilled and much of the land had not yet been leased. Department of Natural Resources,
834 P.2d at 136.
193. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 834 P.2d at 138.
194. Id. The Alaska Constitution provides that "private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18.
195. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 834 P.2d at 140.
196. Id. The court relied on a 1978 letter by the state attorney general as well as testi-
mony by the Director on the Department of Natural Resources before the Senate Re-
sources Committee to show that the companies were on notice. The court also dismissed a
letter by the attorney general in 1984 that the companies argued assured them the confi-
dential data would not be disclosed. The court found that the companies did not rely on
this letter. Id at 141.
197. Id. at 141.
198. Id. The court stated:
The values motivating such investment - the hope of discovering commer-
cial deposits of oil and gas, the utility of well data to the companies for nu-
merous purposes, and the competitive advantage the data provide vis-a-vis
other bidders in future lease sales - outweigh any interest in keeping the
data from [the Department of Natural Resources].
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Each of these cases was decided before the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Dolan v. Tigard.199 In Dolan, the Court held that a regulation
which forces a property owner to relinquish a property right must be
roughly proportional to a legitimate state interest.200 In that case, the
owner of a commercial plumbing business applied for a permit to double
the size of her store. The permit was denied, however, when she refused
to dedicate a portion of her land for a future bicycle and pedestrian track.
The Court determined that there was not a sufficient relationship be-
tween the storeowner's ability to expand her business and the possibility
of the track being built in the future.20'
Following the reasoning of Dolan, the Alaska Supreme Court should
have looked to whether the requirements of the state disclosure law were
roughly proportional to the impact upon the oil companies. If this re-
quirement was not met, the state action would constitute a compensable
taking regardless of the property owner's expectations.
3. Legislation is Silent on Disclosure of Trade Secrets
The least predictable situation arises when a statute is silent on its face
as to whether information will be held as a secret. In this situation the
trade secret owner has neither been forewarned that the information sub-
mitted would be disclosed nor assured that it would not. Therefore, other
circumstances surrounding the disclosure of the trade secret must be con-
sidered in determining whether a taking has been effected. The question
of whether expectations of secrecy are reasonable is a heavily factual
question. 20 2
The Court in Monsanto took this approach when deciding whether
Monsanto could reasonably expect the EPA to maintain confidentiality of
data submitted prior to 1972, when the statute was silent on this issue.
The Court ultimately found Monsanto did not have a reasonable expecta-
tion the information would be kept secret.20 3 The Court relied on a Sen-
ate subcommittee report that included a statement by a chemical
association claiming that the EPA had, in fact, been using data submitted
by one company in applications by another.2 4 Apparently, since the in-
dustry was aware of the EPA's use of one company's data in reviewing
199. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
200. Id. at 2319.
201. Id. at 2321.
202. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1024 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
203. Id. at 1010.
204. Id. at 1009 n.14. The Court quoted a 1972 statement by the National Agricultural
Chemicals Association:
Under the present law registration information submitted to the Administra-
tor has not routinely been made available for public inspection. Such infor-
mation has, however, as a matter of practice but without statutory authority,
been considered by the Administrator to support the registration of the same
or a similar product by another registrant.
Id. (quoting Fed. Envtl. Pesticide Control Act: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Agric.
Research and Gen. Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agric. and Forestry, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, at 245 (1972)).
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another company's application, members of the industry could not claim
they reasonably believed this practice would not occur.205
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor questioned the Court's analysis on this
issue. Justice O'Connor favored remanding the issue to the district court
for further factual findings concerning Monsanto's expectation regarding
interagency uses of trade secret information submitted prior to 1972.206
Justice O'Connor cited the district court's finding that disclosure of trade
secrets was neither permitted by law nor customary practice. 20 7
Despite the difference in result, both the majority and dissent used the
same approach to determine if a compensable taking had occurred. The
circumstances surrounding the submission of the trade secret must be ex-
amined to determine if the trade secret owner reasonably expected his
secret to be protected.208 The only relevant time to consider is the time
when the trade secret is submitted. 209 It does not matter if, at a later
date, the government gave assurances that previously submitted informa-
tion would not be disclosed. 210
The Court's recent ruling in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
would not likely impact on this decision in Monsanto. In Lucas, the
Court determined that total takings must be compensated. 21' Monsanto's
loss, on the other hand, was not a total taking-Monsanto could continue
to use the test data for its own purposes.
In Dolan v. City of Tigard, however, the Court required that the impact
of the regulation be roughly proportional to a legitimate state interest.21 2
205. An interesting question is whether it is enough for companies to believe the EPA
was using data in subsequent applications regardless of whether this belief was factually
correct. It seems that a company could not reasonably expect the trade secret to be main-
tained in confidence if they believed, even though the belief was incorrect, it would not.
The Court never addressed this hypothetical issue.
206. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1021 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
207. Id. The district court found that: "During the period that the USDA administered
FIFRA, it was also its policy that the data developed and submitted by companies such as
[Monsanto] could not be used to support the registration of another's product without
permission of the data submitter." Id. at 1009 n.14 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Acting
Adm'r, United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 564 F. Supp. 552, 564 (E.D. Mo. 1983)
(emphasis in original)).
208. But an "unsolicited proposal" to the government that includes a restriction forbid-
ding the use or disclosure of trade secret information for any purpose other than evaluating
the proposal is not sufficient to create a reasonable expectation of protection. Airborne
Data, Inc. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In Airborne Data, the
government received an unsolicited bid from a company but, after failing to negotiate a
contract, disclosed the information to a third party who was later awarded a contract. In
adopting the Claims Court opinion, the Federal Circuit said, "the essential inquiry is
whether the injury to that property 'rises to the magnitude of an appropriation of some
interest in [the) property permanently to the use of the Government.'" Id. (quoting Na-
tional By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256 (Ct. Cl. 1969)). The court did,
however, find that an implied-in-fact contract had been formed prohibiting government
disclosure of Airborne's trade secret information and required further proceedings to de-
termine damages. Airborne Data, 702 F.2d at 1361.
209. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013 n.17.
210. Id
211. 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
212. 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
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In Monsanto, on the other hand, the Court did not focus on this factor,
although it is unquestionable that the government could have shown a
legitimate state interest. It is less clear, however, whether the Court
would still have found the necessary nexus between state interest and
property owner's loss.
In a 1987 case, the Third Circuit had to determine whether the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) was correct in finding that they did not
have the authority to use the test information from one drug company in
the application of a generic drug by another company. 213 In Tri-Bio Lab-
oratories, a third party drug manufacturer, Schering Corp., developed a
drug under the brand name of "Garasol." Schering obtained a patent on
its development in 1963. The drug was approved by the FDA in 1978,
and two years later, in 1980, the patent expired. Tri-Bio Laboratories
then applied for FDA approval of a generic version of Schering's drug.
To meet the testing requirement, Tri-Bio referred to Schering's previous
test data. The FDA, however, refused to consider the test data because it
considered Schering's data to be proprietary information and determined
that the use of the pioneer company's data in an application of another
company would constitute a taking.
The court agreed with the FDA and found that the statute did not per-
mit the FDA's use of the pioneer drug manufacturer's data in the process-
ing of a generic manufacturer's new drug application.214 To reach this
conclusion, the court analyzed the statute to determine if the pioneer
manufacturer had an investment-backed expectation that the test data
would not be disseminated. 215 First, the court did not find anything in the
Act evidencing any intent to have the government compensate the pio-
neer registrant for the use of its data to review a generic application. 216
Because the statute did not provide for the subsequent use of the test
data, the court looked at other circumstances surrounding the applica-
tion. The deciding factor was a regulation that memorialized FDA policy
and prohibited the use of information without the consent of the submit-
ter.217 As a result, any use of the data would constitute a taking by the
government and compensation would be required.
Other legislation may also affect a trade secret owner's expectation of
protection. The Trade Secrets Act 218 is one statute which may be useful
213. Tri-Bio Labs., Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 818 (1988).
214. Id. at 141.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 141. The regulation stated that "[any reference to information furnished by
a person other than the applicant may not be considered unless its use is authorized in a
written statement signed by the person who submitted it." 21 C.F.R. § 514.1(a) (1987)
(originally codified at 21 C.F.R. § 135.4a(a)), redesignated to 21 C.F.R. § 514.1(a) by 40
Fed. Reg. 13802, 13825 (1975).
218. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1988). The rade Secrets Act states:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any depart-
ment or agency thereof.... publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in
any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming
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in determining whether a trade secret owner had a reasonable expecta-
tion that her secret would be protected.2 19 The prohibition of disclosure
extends not only to individuals, but also to formal and official agency
action.220 Of course, if the statute permits disclosure, then the Trade
Secrets Act is inapplicable because the disclosure is, in the words of the
Act, "authorized by law."
In Monsanto, Justice O'Connor stated that the Trade Secrets Act cre-
ated at least as strong an expectation as the 1972 version of the statute
that called for data submission.221 The Trade Secrets Act prohibited gov-
ernment disclosure of trade secret information revealed during the course
of official duties, while the 1972 version of FIFRA prohibited the EPA
from disclosing "trade secrets or commercial or financial information. ' 222
Justice O'Connor failed to see the difference between the two.223
On the other hand, legislation exists that promotes the disclosure of
information thereby diminishing a trade secret owner's expectation of
protection. As a result, courts must sometimes weigh the conflicting poli-
cies. For example, the Freedom of Information Act2 2 4 is a statute al-
lowing government disclosure of certain information. The Act also
includes an exemption for trade secret information.22 5 At least one dis-
trict court, however, has more narrowly interpreted trade secrets in deter-
mining the scope of government disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act.226 As a result, the trade secret owner may have a diffi-
to him in the course of his employment or official duties ... [that] concerns
or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or appara-
tus... shall be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.
Id.
219. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1008. Although the Trade Secrets Act prohibits the disclo-
sure of trade secret information, it is a criminal statute and accordingly affords no private
right of action to prevent disclosure in violation with its provisions. Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979).
220. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1008. See also Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 298-301.
221. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
225. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988) (exempting from disclosure "trade secrets and com-
mercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential").
See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280, 1288(D.C. Cir. 1983) (defining "[Tirade secret, solely for the purpose of FOIA [Freedom of
Information Act] Exemption 4, as a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process,
or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade
commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial
effort."). See generally Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, What Constitutes "Trade Secrets"
Exempt from Disclosure under State Freedom of Information Act, 27 A.L.R. 4th 773 (1984).
226. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr. v. United States, 617 F. Supp. 279, 285 (S.D.
Fla. 1985). In Burnside-Ott the court held that if the Trade Secrets Act was broadly read to
include all information relating to corporate activities, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) would be vitiated. Id. The court feared that "[n]o government agency could dis-
close any data whatever despite the provisions of the FOIA, for fear of violating § 1905
[the Trade Secret Act]." Id. See John C. Janka, Comment, Federal Disclosure Statutes and
the Fifth Amendment. The New Status of Trade Secrets, 54 U. CHi. L. Ruv. 334 (1987)
(concluding that Monsanto should be interpreted to change the way that FOIA is inter-
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cult time predicting beforehand whether his information will be
protected.
C. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ACTION
In determining whether government action rises past mere regulation
to become a compensable taking, courts will also consider the economic
impact of the government action. According to Justice Holmes, "if regu-
lation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. ' 227 In Pennsylvania
Coal Co., the Court found that the statute that limited coal mining in
certain circumstances affected a taking because the coal company had lost
all practical economic value in the mineral rights.228
Modern courts, however, seem to be much more deferential to the leg-
islation and are not often inclined to find the economic impact so harsh as
to transform the regulation into a taking. This inclination is especially
true in the licensure context. In Monsanto, for example, the Court did
not even consider the economic harm because the presence and absence
of a reasonable investment-backed expectation of protection was such an
overwhelming factor.229
In New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey,230 the Third Cir-
cuit found that the extreme economic impact was outweighed by the lack
of any expectation that the trade secret would be protected.231 The dis-
trict court admitted that "[e]mployers may face the unpleasant choice of
disclosing trade secrets or limiting or shutting down operations in New
Jersey. '232 Even though this may be a more onerous dilemma than Mon-
santo faced, the lack of reasonable investment-backed expectation still
prevailed.
V. TAKING FOR PUBLIC USE
Modern courts have been very deferential to legislative determinations
of whether the taking of property has been for a public use.233 Although
the public use rule originally provided a serious constraint on government
action, so many exceptions have developed that the rule itself has been
preted by declaring that legislatively-mandated disclosure of trade secrets is a taking re-
gardless of notice to the owner).
227. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
228. Id. at 414; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
229. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005.
230. 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985). See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing
the facts in Hughey).
231. Id. at 598.
232. 600 F. Supp. 606, 628 (1985).
233. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that the condemnation of slum
properties for the purpose of reselling the land to private parties was within the police
power of the government); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding
that state law which authorized the forced sale of land to lessees was constitutional because




abandoned. 234 In general, the public use limitation is met as long as the
object of the taking is within the government's authority.235
In cases involving trade secrets, the Supreme Court has followed the
trend of being extremely deferential. For example, in Monsanto the
Court held that Congress is empowered with determining whether infor-
mation should be publicly disclosed.236 The Court requires only the most
minimal standard, that the action be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.237 This standard applies even when the direct bene-
ficiaries of the taking are private citizens rather than the public in gen-
eral.238 As a result, the public use requirement provides practically no
restriction on government actions that take trade secrets.239
VI. JUST COMPENSATION FOR TRADE SECRETS THAT
HAVE BEEN TAKEN
Once it has been determined that a taking of property has occurred,
the only remaining question is whether the owner has been justly com-
pensated.240 The Fifth Amendment does not provide trade secret owners
with a mechanism to stop the government from taking the property. 241
An injunction is not available. 242
234. STONE, supra note 56, at 1567; see also Dunham, Griggs v. Alleghany County in
Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63, 65-
71; Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599 (1949).
235. NowA, supra note 1, § 11.13. State governments effect a taking whenever the
purpose of the action is for the benefit of the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens while
the federal government may effect a taking whenever the object of the exercise bears any
reasonable relationship to one of its implied or enumerated powers. Id.
236. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1015-16 ("[T]he optimum amount of disclosure to the public
is for Congress, not the courts, to decide, and that the statute embodies Congress' judg-
ment on that question.").
237. Id. at 1014 ("So long as the taking has a conceivable public character, 'the means
by which it will be attained is... for Congress to determine.' ") (quoting Berman, 348 U.S.
at 33).
238. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 577 (1985) ("In Mon-
santo, we ruled that FIFRA's data-consideration provisions may be deemed a 'public use'
even though the most direct beneficiaries of the regulatory scheme will be the later
applicants.").
239. Interestingly, in Lariscey v. United States (where a state prison manufacturing
company appropriated a prison laborer's manufacturing trade secret), the Federal Circuit
did not even address the public use issue. Upon finding a taking, the court remanded the
case for determination of just compensation. Lariscey v. United States, 949 F.2d 1137, 1145
(Fed. Cir. 1991). It is hard to imagine how the taking of Mr. Lariscey's trade secret could
benefit the public health, safety, or welfare. By allowing the state to continue using the
process, however, the court apparently found that there was a public use. See supra notes
121-34 and accompanying text (discussing the facts in Lariscey).
240. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 (1985) (reciting
the principle that "so long as compensation is available for those whose property is in fact
taken, the governmental action is not unconstitutional").
241. Lariscey v. United States, 949 F.2.d 1137, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("The Fifth Amend-
ment is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but
rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to
a taking.").
242. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,467 U.S. 986,1016 (1984) (stating that "[e]quitable
relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly
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The issue then is a matter of what the trade secret owner can expect in
terms of compensation. Relatively little case law has arisen on exactly
what constitutes just compensation for the taking of trade secrets. 243
Some insight may be gained, however, by looking to closely related top-
ics. First, the next section will review typical remedies for misappropria-
tion of trade secrets cases between private parties. The following section
will relate these methods to government takings by reviewing the better
established law related to the taking of patents.
A. REMEDIES FOR TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION
In general, when trade secrets are misappropriated, the owner can re-
cover either the damages sustained by him or the profits gained by the
wrongdoer.2 " Since private cases of trade secret misappropriation often
involve theft or other wrongdoing, principles of unjust enrichment must
be considered. 245 In eminent domain cases, on the other hand, courts
look to the loss of the owner rather than to the gain by the govern-
ment.246 Since the government has the right to obtain property by emi-
nent domain, nobody has been unjustly enriched.247
Therefore, the measure of just compensation is typically measured only
by the loss suffered by the trade secret owner. In the paragraphs that
follow, several methods for measuring this loss will be reviewed in the
context of private misappropriations. These methods include lost profit,
development cost, and reasonable royalty.
The profit lost by the owner of a misappropriated trade secret is a pri-
mary component in measuring damages. 248 For example, when the owner
of a trade secret loses business because of the disclosure of her secret to
competitors, she can recover the profit she would have earned had her
secret not been disclosed.249 For example, in Sperry Rand the plaintiff
was underbid on government contracts for radar sets after the defendants
improperly used the plaintiff's secret technical information in their own
authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign
subsequent to the taking").
243. One reason there is so little insight may be because if the legislation includes a
remedy for the disclosure of information, then it is likely a taking will not be found in the
first place and, therefore, the analysis never reaches the point of determining whether the
compensation is just.
244. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1017, reh'g denied, 459 F.2d 19 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1973). See
12A R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 7.08[3] (1985); UNIF. TRADE SECRET
Acr § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 439 (1985); Wis. STAT. § 134.90(4)(a) (1991).
245. See William F. Johnson, Jr., Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 72 N.W.U. L.
REv. 1004, 1014 (1978).
246. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
247. See Oberdick, supra note 6, at 247, n.80.
248. See Robert B. Vance & Assoc., Inc. v. Baronet Corp., 487 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (indicating that lost profits were preferred measure of damages upon finding of mis-
appropriation of customer lists); Johnson, supra note 245, at 1020-23 (reasoning that a
monopoly has been created by the existence of a trade secret and the disclosure of that
secret ends the monopoly resulting in lost business).
249. See Sperry-Rand, 447 F.2d at 1393-94.
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bid. The court awarded Sperry Rand the amount of profit it would have
earned on both this contract and another expected add-on contract.250
Another method to determine the just compensation for a trade secret
is to pay the trade secret owner all or some of the cost it took to develop
the secret. In Kubik, Inc. v. Hull,25 ' a former employee brought a
number of trade secrets to his new employer. Since a large number of
products which included the secret had been marketed by the trade secret
owner, other competitors could legally copy it and therefore the disclo-
sure itself did not cause any significant harm. The court did hold, how-
ever, that things such as the amount of time, labor, and money invested in
developing a trade secret could be considered when determining the ap-
propriate damages. 252
Yet another measure of the appropriate remedy for misappropriation
of a trade secret is the reasonable royalty method.253 In a number of
cases, the amount of the reasonable royalty is determined from previous
business dealings of the parties.254 In other cases, however, the courts
must determine the royalty by other means. For example, the court may
look to the royalty rate charged to other manufacturers who have taken
patent licenses.255
In some cases, the value of the trade secret has simply been the market
value at the time of misappropriation. For example, in Precision Plating
& Metal Finishing, Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,256 the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed a measurement of damages as the value at the time the secret was
misappropriated. 257 The court looked to the investment value of the
trade secret.258 The investment value was defined as the amount a rea-
250. Id. at 1392. Cf University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d
518 (5th Cir. 1974) (denying lost profits when the trade secret had not been disclosed and
the misappropriation had no obvious effect on the owner).
251. 224 N.W.2d 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
252. Id at 95. See also University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d
518 (5th Cir. 1974) (allowing jury to consider cost of developing a computer program when
determining damages for misappropriation of trade secret); Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul,
Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, 1973 writ ref'd n.r.e.) (indicating the costs of
researching and developing a secret manufacturing process were relevant to the determina-
tion of damages).
253. See Oberdick, supra note 6, at 247 (arguing that reasonable royalty is the most
appropriate measure of just compensation in situations in which trade secrets have been
taken by the government).
254. See Vitro Corp. of America v. Hall Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1961) (using
royalty established during course of negotiation of license agreement, even though no
agreement was ever entered into); Saco-Lowell Shops v. Reynolds, 141 F.2d 587 (4th Cir.
1944) (finding a reasonable royalty in licensing agreement parties had entered into); Sloan
v. Mud Prod., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 916 (D. Okla. 1953) (using royalty rate from expired li-
censing agreement); E. L. Bruce Co. v. Bradley Lumber Co., 79 F. Supp. 176 (D. Ark.
1948) (holding that the reasonable royalty was based on amount of royalty set forth in
patent license agreement canceled by defendant).
255. ,Carter Prod., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Md. 1963).
256. 435 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1970).




sonable investor would pay based upon the potential return in light of the
facts and circumstances. 25 9
B. COMPENSATION WHEN PATENTS ARE APPROPRIATED BY
GOVERNMENT
When the Federal Government acquires someone's patent, the Fifth
Amendment issues are not reached because the area is controlled by stat-
ute.260 Section 1498 is, in effect, an eminent domain statute entitling the
government to use a patented article by paying compensation to the pat-
ent owner.261 Therefore it will be informative to review how compensa-
tion is determined for patents "taken" by the government in order to gain
insight into how trade secrets will be compensated.
First, however, it is important to note that there are several differences
between patents and trade secrets.262 Not all trade secrets are patenta-
ble.263 The scope of subject matter of a patent is much more narrowly
limited the scope of a trade secret.264 In addition, patentable subject mat-
ter must be new,265 useful,266 and non-obvious.26 7 The patent owner
must disclose his invention to the public rather than keep it secret. 268
Trade secret owners, of course, must not. As a result, disclosure does not
harm the patent owner. Also, patents have a limited term after which the
subject matter is in the public domain and anyone can use the informa-
tion.269 On the other hand, a trade secret can be kept indefinitely.
259. Id. See also Digital Dev. Corp. v. International Memory Sys., 185 U.S.P.Q. 136
(S.D. Cal. 1973) (allowing recovery of "the reasonable value of the unauthorized appropri-
ation of its ideas and design").
260. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1988). Section 1498(a) states:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of
the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the
owner's remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United
States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture.
This statute does not apply to state governments that are immune from patent suits on
grounds of the 11th Amendment. Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 810 (1990). The Federal Circuit has noted that patent owners could assert a tak-
ings claim against a state under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Jacobs Wind Elec.
Co. v. Florida Dept. of Trans., 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
261. Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (citing
U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Crozier v. Fried Krupp, 224 U.S. 290 (1911) and Waite v.
United States, 282 U.S. 508 (1931)).
262. The owner of a patent is entitled to legally exclude others from making, using, or
selling the patented invention for the term of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988). The
owner of a trade secret, on the other hand, excludes others by not disclosing the secret.
263. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
264. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (limiting the subject of patents to a "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" or improvements thereof) with RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (discussed supra note 263 and accompanying
text).
265. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
266. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
267. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
268. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
269. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). A patent is enforceable for 17 years. Id.
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But these differences aside, both patents and trade secrets are intangi-
ble property. When a person other than the property owner is entitled to
use the protected information, the property owner has suffered a loss.
The question here is how to put a value on that loss.
Several bases for recovery can be used to valuate a patent license. The
court may determine a reasonable royalty.270 In other cases, the amount
of profit lost by the patent owner may be used as the basis for recov-
ery.27 1 In a small number of cases, the savings by the government served
as the basis of the compensation of the patent owner.272 Lost profit, rea-
sonable royalty, and gain received by the misappropriater are also the
common ways in which private trade secret misappropriation cases are
resolved.273
The reasonable royalty is the preferred measure of compensation for
the government's procurement of an individual's patent rights.274 In the
early patent case of Egry Register Co. v. Standard Register Co.,275 the
Sixth Circuit developed a standard by describing the legal fiction of "what
the parties would have agreed upon, if both were reasonably trying to
reach agreement. '276 To determine the reasonable royalty, the court will
try to look at the actual value of what has been taken.277 A reasonable
estimate will be used when no exact quantification is possible.278
VII. CONCLUSION
In the last ten years it has been repeatedly affirmed that the Constitu-
tion provides the owner of a trade secret protection from the govern-
ment. In Monsanto, the Court affirmed that a trade secret is a property
interest and therefore protected by the Fifth Amendment. 279 This deci-
sion is a positive step in encouraging investment and scientific
development.
270. Calhoun v. United States, 453 F.2d 1385 (Ct. Cl. 1972). See also Amerace Esna
Corp. v. United States, 462 F.2d 1377 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d
1106 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
271. Imperial Mach. & Foundry Corp. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 667 (1930).
272. Shearer v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 196 (1942), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 676 (1944);
OIsson v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 495 (1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 621 (1939).
273. See supra notes 244-59 and accompanying text.
274. Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Leesona Corp. v.
United States, 599 F.2d 958, 971 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (noting that lost profits and savings by
government are factors in determining reasonable royalty).
275. 23 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1928).
276. Id. at 443. The court reasoned:
To adopt a reasonable royalty as the measure of damages is to adopt and
interpret, as well as may be, the fiction that a license was to be granted at the
time of beginning the infringement, and then to determine what the license
price should have been. In effect, the court assumes the existence, ab initio
of, and declares the equitable terms of, a suppositious license, and does this
nunc protunc; it creates and applies retrospectively a compulsory license.
Id.
277. Vitro Corp. of Am. v. Hall Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 1961).
278. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 537 (5th Cir.
1974).
279. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004 (1984).
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Supreme Court decisions in land use regulation cases also provide en-
couragement for the trade secret owner. The Court has been less defer-
ential in accepting any government justification for the taking of private
property. The government now carries the burden of showing that the
regulation is roughly proportional to the property owner's loss. In fact, if
the loss is total, the property owner will most certainly be compensated.
But the trade secret owner must be cautioned. If the area in which the
trade secret pertains is one that is regulated, the government has a great
deal of authority. Justice Holmes once said "if a regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking. '280 Today, at least in the area of trade
secrets, Justice Holmes would have to say "if a regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking unless the owner was on notice of the regu-
lation." Once the government has given notice of disclosure, the loss of
trade secret information must be considered a cost of doing business. 281
It is debatable whether companies should reasonably bear this cost.
Untangling the web of public policy goals is not a simple task. Regulation
of potential dangers and adequate protection of American industry are
each important goals. On one hand, the government attempts to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts. 282 On the other hand, the
government must protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.
While some argue health and safety regulations which publicly discloses
testing information are needed to avoid the potentially dangerous effects
of chemicals and other materials, 283 companies that own trade secrets ar-
gue that regulations which disclose trade secrets provide a disincentive to
the great expense required to promote technology.2 84
Regardless of who is right and who is wrong about the public policy
issues, the trade secret owner must carefully consider the effect govern-
ment actions will have on the property at issue. Protecting that interest
may be an uphill task. First, the owner will need to prove that the prop-
erty right exists in the first place by looking to state law or federal statute.
The next step will be demonstrating that the government action has risen
to the level of being treated as a taking. The key elements are whether
the required disclosure is in response to a request from the owner and
whether the owner knew of the disclosure. If the owner was on notice,
the government is not required to compensate any loss. The opportunity
to conduct business serves as the compensation. Even if the action was a
280. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
281. "Employers may face the unpleasant choice of disclosing trade secrets or limiting
or shutting down operations in New Jersey." New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v.
Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606, 628 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985) (referring to a
state Freedom of Information Act requiring disclosure of hazardous chemicals).
282. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (referring to Congress's power to grant patents and
copyrights).
283. AFL-CIO Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 2, Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (No. 83-196).
284. Monsanto claimed that its development of trade secrets required a massive com-
mitment of resources and energy costing the company $70 million in 1981 alone. Brief for
Appellee at 21, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (No. 83-196).
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taking, the owner cannot prevent the disclosure but is limited to the col-
lection of just compensation.

